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Introduction
Various authors have atressed the role of intangible or lnvisible assets such as marketing, management and technology in the formation of multínational enterprises.l However, the theory of the taxation of the multinational has so far ignored the i mportance of taxation for the multinational's i nvestment !n intangibles. Instead, the previous theory such as in Feldstein and Hartman [1979] has primarily viewed the multinational es an agent of international capital mobility, and has focused on the multinational's physical capital export and import decision. The existing theory then ís an applicatlon of the theory of optimal taxes on ínternational capital flows. Th1s paper examines the link between taxation and the multinational's investment in reaearch and development of new products, which is no doubt an important intangible. The paper ahows that depending on the parameterization of the private sector's preferences the source country should provide more or less than a full domestic tax credit towards income taxes paid abroad. However, for the in-between caae where private and public goods are perfect subsitutes we show the source country optimally providea a tax credit and capturea no tax revenues from the multinational's foreign operations, as ís approximately the case for the United States at present.2
This paper builda on the statlc models of tzade in differentiated products of Krugman [1979a] , Dixit and Norman [1980J and Feenstra and Judd [1982] and others.
In particular, the model assumes the economy producea a traditional good, and several varieties of manufactures in a monopolistically competitive market setting. The production of manufactures consists of an initial development stage, and a subsequent production stage.
At the development stage, firms can create a new product at a fixed cost per product. Once the initial development effort has been undertaken, the good can be produced anywhere at constant marginal cost.
Consumers in all countries stand to benefit from the introduction of additional manufactures, and thus product development takes on the characteristics of an international public good. The number of varieties of the manufactured good that will be produced depends on the multinationala' ability to generate after-tax profits in each of the potential marketa, as affected by tax policy. Thus natlonal tax policy towards multinational enterpríses affects the development of manufactures worldwlde, even if national tax authorities ignore the implications of national tax policy for the introduction of new products abroad.
The paper focusea on the tax policies of a single source and a single host country. Tax policy in either country represent a trade-off between the objectives of raising national income by way of additíonal tax revanues, and of providing multinationals with adequate incentives to develop new manufactures. Generally the host country is shown to capture more tax revenues associated with Che multinational's host country'a operations than the source country. Underl~.ing this result is the institutional asymmetry where the host country has a firat right to tax host country income, leavíng the source country to tax income after host country taxes. However, the souzce country stands to benefit from the foreign operationa of its multinationals, even if it receives little or no direct tax beneflts from a multinational's foreign operations, because multinationals that venture abroad will invest more in product innovation to the benefit of domeatic consumers.
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The remainder of this papez is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model, and analyses the decisions of consumers and firms. Section 3 turns to the governments' taxatíon decísion and to international tax interdependence. Section 4 concludes the paper.
The model
The model describes national taxation policies towards multinational enterprises that mazket their products ín each of Cwo countríes. The existence of multinational firms that develop products in a source country and subsequently manufacture these products in both the source and host countries can be ratíonalized on the basis of the costs of licensing information and of transportation.3 As our focus is on tax policy towards the multinational enterpríae we will take the existence of the multinational as given. Assuming a residence-based tax system, there is the institutional asymmetry where the source country can tax the multlnational's source country income and after-host-country-tax host country income, while the host country can only tax the multinational enterprise's income generated wíthin host country borders. Otherwise, the countríes are entirely symmetric.
Labor, denoted L, is the only factor of production. It can ba used to produce three categories of goods: a traditional good, called wheat and denoted W, produced by a competitive agricultural sector; a pure public good, P; and manufacures, M, produced by the multinational industrial sector. Wheat and the public good are produced with constant returns to scale production technologies, and units are chosen such that one unit of labor is required to produce one unit of either wheat or the public good.
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The production of manufactures, whích exhibits increasing returns to scale, requires an initial research and development effort undertaken in the source country followed by production in either country. At the research stage, a fixed resource cost r is incurred per variety of the manufacture.
At the production stage, units are agaln chosen such that one unit of labor produces one unit of manufacture.
We now first characterize the consumer's choice problem and derive his demand for wheat and manufactures. The derived goods demand functlons and the tax environment together determine the firm's decision of inveatment into research and development and the subsequent productíon decisions.
Section 3 of the paper turns to the two countries' taxation policies given consumer and firm behavior. .
The consumer
Consumer income is equal to the inelastic labor supply L1 in country i. As we will assume the manufacturing aector is characterized by monopolístic competition, there will be no profits returned to consumers.
The representative consumer spends his wage income L so as to maximize the following utility index
( 1) where n is the number of uanufactures, subscripts refer to the source and host countries, and superscripts to dífferent manufactures.
As is well known, the above utility specification gives rise to the following demand relationships for wheat and each of the n manufaetures
where p is the price of any manufacture in terms of wheat.
The firm
Fírms are interested in maximizing worldwide after tax profits. This implies they will introduce new produces to the point where at the margin worldwide after-tax profits just cover the ínitial research and development outlay of an additlonal variety of the manufacture. Let a~and ah be the pre-tax profits aseociated with product j aarned in the source and host countries respectlvely. Also let ri be the tax levled by country 1(is,h) on profits generated in country j(j -s,h). Thus r~and re aze the source country tax on source country income and the host country tax on host country income respectively. r~is the souce country táx applicable to (after host country taxes) host country income. As Che host country can not tax the multinational's income generated in the source country, we have rh -
0.
With a monopoliatically competítive market structure, the number of goods n is determined by the requirement that after-tax worldwide profita per good are exactly equal to the cost of development.~GLven the previous notation this requirement can be written as
(1 -r~)s; t (1 -r;)(1 -rh)xó -r . j -1,...,n (4)
where again a~~and aA~are the maximal pre-tax profits net of the reaearch and development costs that the firm can achieve gíven that n varintiea are produced and given the demand functions (3).
Profits~are given by
where p is the price of any manufacture in terms of wheat and c is the cost of production. Given our technological assumptions, the cost of production c is simply equal to 1 i n terms of wheat.
Optimally the price p is set such that
where o-1 1~ís the elasticity of demand.s
Substituting for Ni and p from ( 3) and ( 6) into (5), we can now write pre-tax profits ai as
Clearly, pre-tax profits per manufacture j decrease with the total number of manufactures n on the market. Now we can substitute for x!f rom (7) into (4) and solve for the number of varieties n that will be produced by the manufacturing sector. Solving for n yields
The above expression indícates that the number of manufactures n increases with the ahare of income a apent on manufactures and with source and host country disposable incomes L~and Lh. It decreasea with the demand elasticity o, the development coat z and, not surprisingly, the tax ratea f~and fn.
National taxation oolicies and tax inter~eoen~or~P
In this section we turn to the determination of tax ratea in the source and host countriea. As both countriea' tax rates affect the number of varieties produced in the manufacturing sector, tax rates are interdependent.
For each of the two countrias, we first determine how domestic taxation optimally depends on foreign taxation. Then we determine how tax rates are set noncooperatively for a special case of the consumer's utility specification.
Source countrv tax nolicv
The source country's government has to set the tax rates f~and rã pplicable to the multinational's domeatic income and after-host-countrytaxes host country income respectively. It La probably reasonable to assume that the domestic tax rate r~is exogenous to host country taxation of multinational enterprises and fixed at f~~.s The source country government then is left to determine r~. Public revenue -and also the provision of the public good in the source country -P~is related to the tax rate r~as follows P~-r~~n~t r~(1 -rs)ne (9)
Subsituting for e from (7), we see that P~equals aL~aLP~( 7~~ó t f~(1 -fe) ó j
The government sets the tax rate r~so as to maximlze the (2), (3) and (10) into (1), we can write the government's objective function as In particular, as y goes to infinity (12) implies that r~w111 optimally be set so as to keep the product r~(1 -re) constant. Thua for ry very large, tax policy is set so as to keep total tax revenuea and the provision of public goods constant regardless of the host country tax rate rb.
Further, for the special case where ry-1 equation (12) implies that optimally r~is set so as to keep the number of varietíes n constant.
From ( 8) we see that the constancy of n requires that the expression (1 -r~)(1 -r~) is held fixed. Thus r~ia optímally adjusted in rasponaes to changes in re so as to keep the overall after-tax foreign source incoma of the multinational fixed. This Ls equivalent to saying that the aource country grants a tax credit to host country taxes.~Note that the tax credit arises endogenously after we assume the aource country sets íts tax rate r~-applicable to the aource country hoat country tax baseoptimally Ln response to host country tax changes. Thus the tax credit can aríse as the optímal reaction to host country tax changes rathar than as a rule that is given a priori.e
Host countrv tax oolicv
The host government facea the task of setting the tax rate rb. Host country public revenue P~is used to finance the proviaion of hoat country's public good. Public revenue Pe is simply related to the host country tax rate rh as follows
Subsituting for xh from (6) into (13), we get the following expression
The dístinction between (10) and (14) reflects the fact that the host country can only tax the multínational's host country revenue, and that the host country has as fírst right to tax host country revenue. (2), (3), (8) and (14). Subsituting for Wy, I!h and Pb from (2), (3) and (14) into (1) 
where again use is made of the fact that p -0~(0-1).
After differentiating ( 15) with respect to rh, we can write tha source country's optimality condition as follows
(1-7) B n -9~hI(1 -r;)rh 1 where Qzra-7 1 -Q 1-a I~-7 g Bh -wlrn-ry
Again the way in which rh is optimally adjusted to changes in the source country tax rate r~depends critically on the parameter y. As an illuatration we can take the case where fh -1~3 and r~-1~2 so that P~-Pb. Turning to (g), we see that for thís case the number of goods n is more responsive to a change i n r~than to a change in rbĨ n particular, (ón~ár~)~(án~árh) -4~3. On the other hand, source country lz tax revenues and the provision of the public good are less responslve to rt han host country tax revenue to rh. In partícular, (bP~~6r~)~(6P~~6rh) -
1~2.
From the source country's perspective addltional product varieties are thus less expensive in terms of foregone publíc goods than for the hoat country.
In particular, in thís example 6n~dP~-(6~3)bn~6Ph. Thís demonstrates that with equal tax revenues for the 2 countries the source country hae a larger incentive to provide a tax incentive for additional product innovation, and that thus the situation of equal tax ravenues can thus not be an equilibrium.
In general the tax rate lnteraction depends in some complex way on the parameters of the model and in particular on ry.
In the ramainder of this section, we wíll examine the tax competition between the two countriea for the special case of ry-1. While there is no presumption that in fact 7-1 and that thus private and public goods are perfect subsitutes in the utility specification (1), this special case is interestíng as the reaultíng tax interaction appears to represent closely the tax interaction betwaen, for instance, the United States and developing countries where U.S. multinationals operate.
For the case where ry-1, we have shown earlier that the source country wishes to keep n constant, which from (8) implies the expression (1 -r~)(1 -rá) is independent of r~for interiot solutions of r~. Lat us assume that if r~-0, then the equality (12) implies r~-rá~where 0~r~' t 1. This implies that r~-0 and rh -rh~ia a point on the reaction curve that indicates the optimal aource country tax rata r~r for any given host country tax rate r~. Algebraically, this reaction curve can be represented as follows
Thís relationship is represented by the curve labeled S in Figure 1 .
Turning to the host country, ít is immediately clear from (12) and (16) that for the specíal case of 7-1 the optimal number of goods from the host country's perspective is less than from the source country's perspective for any positive source country tax rate r~. Noting (S), this shows that for 0 G r~5 1 the host country reaction curve, labeled H in Figure 1 , lies to the right of the source country reaction curve, S.o Equation (16) also implies that for some r~~where 0 G r~~G 1, lf r~~s r~5 1, then optimally rh -l.lo Finally, note that for r~-0 equations (12) and (16) are identical.
Using these facts, we can draw a host country reactíon curve, H, as ín Figure 1 .
Note that the unique Nash equilibríum in the tax ratas rã nd rh is characterized by the intersection of the S and H curvea, where we have r~-0 and 0 G rT G 1.11 Thís establishes that in equilibrium the host country gets positive tax revenue from host country íncome, while the source countty gets none.
The foregoing results accord well with the reality of the taxation of U.S. multinationals. The United States índeed provides a tax credit to U.S.
multinationals' host country taxes on foreign source income rather than a mere deduction which was found optímal ín Feldstein and Hartman [1979j. Undez this system host countzies frequently find it in their Lnterest to raise the host country tax rate at least to the level of the U.S, domestic tax rate such that the U.S. treasury receíves no tax revanues at all from One implication of the model, which was not atressed in the text, Ls that the noncooperative tax equilibrium will be inefficient. In partícular, countries will set their tax ratea such that thera will be an underprovisíon of product varieties by the multinational enterprises. When countries aet their tax rates for the product innovating multinational they do not take into account the externality of domestic tax policy to foreign conaumera and thus they will generally set taxes too hígh and the multinationals will engage ín too little innovation from a worldwide perspecitve.
A final issue concerna how the analysis would be altered if tax havens were included in the model. Tax havens in principle can make a differance as they enable a multínational to incorporate outside both the hoat and the source countries, thereby avoiding any source country taxation of host country income. However, for the caae where the model yields the result that in equilibrium r~-0, it will do the multinational no good to incorporate off-ahore. Tha inability of the U.S. to derive aubstantial tax revenues from the multinationals' foreign operations under the present regime may well explain why so many U.S. multinationals in fact remain incorporated within the United States.
Endnotes
1.
For a general discussion of the role of intangible assets in multinational enterprise, see Caves [1982J. Models of the multlnational enterprise based on this view and their implications for international trade, are examined in Markusen (1984] and Helpman [1984] .
2.
For 1984 the tax liability before tax credits for U.S. corporationa was 5107.9 billíon on 5257.0 billion of worldwide income.
s22.9 billion of foreign tax credits and 521.2 billion of other tax credits reduced the actual tax liability to 563.9 billlon.
(See S~atistics on Income 19 4 Cor~oratíon Income Tax Returns, Table 16 , p. 66).
3. The multinational could equally well produce only in the source country and subsequently export to the foreígn country.
However, in this case there is some ambiguity as to where the multinational will locate its profits for tax purposes as the multinational could transfer price its exports at eíther production cost or final exort sales price. See Ethier [1986) and Horstmann and Markusen [1987) for a discussion of licensing and the multinational enterprise.
4. One can think of having n multinatíonal enterprisea that each produce one variety of the manufactured good.
If n is lazge, thls will glve rise to a monopolistically competitive market structure.
S. More acurately, the elasticity o approaches 1~(1 -~) when the number of varieties goes to infinity.
For a discussion, see Krugman and Helpman [1985] .
6. Alternatively, one could assume that the two domestic tax ratea are set equal so that r~-r~. The results shown below for the special case of 7-1 goes through under this assumption.
7.
For the value of r~~such that r~~-(1 -r~)(1 -rh) i s conaiatent with the quantity n that is optimal from the source country's perspective, there is a tax credit where the domestic tax rate and composite tax on foreign source íncome are equal.
8. Note that the tax credit arises endogenously after we aseume the source country sets its tax rate r~-applicable to the aource country host country tax base -optimally in reaponse to hoat country tax changss.
Thua the tax credit arises as the optimal reaction to host country tax changea rathsr than as a rule that is gíven a priori.
Of course, the model does not allow us to distinguish whether source country tax rates are set optímally given that the tax system will exhibit a foreign source income tax credit, or whether tax rates are set optimally in some general fashíon and then yield a tax credit endogenously.
9.
If r~~-0, then the host country reaction curve H lies to the right of the source country reaction curve S for any point except the point r~-0 and rh -rh~.
If instead r~~~0, then the curve H meets the rh~-axis to the ríght of the point where the re~-axis..
